It has been proven that network coding can provide significant benefits to networks, but such systems are very vulnerable to pollution attacks. In recent years, many schemes have been designed to prevent these attacks. But most of them are based on expensive operation, such as discrete logarithms and Weil pairing operations on elliptic curves, these schemes are inefficient in verifying the integrity of messages and not suitable for those scenarios with low computing capability such as mobile Ad hoc networks and wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we proposed a novel signature scheme for network coding based on a homomorphic public cryptography. This scheme can detect those polluted messages and discard them. What's more, replaying attacks are also infeasible in this scheme. The most important feature of this scheme is the improvement of the authentication efficiency with a fast computation, that is, the time complexity of the verification in our signature scheme is much less than those in the existing algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
As the applications of network coding in traditional computer networks, wireless sensor networks [1] and peer-to-peer systems [2] , more and more people begin to pay attention to this new technique. Network coding was first proposed by Ahlswede et al. [3] . They proved that the throughput of multicast in networks could be increased by allowing the node to encode its input messages to generate a new output one. Later, Li et al. [4] further proved that linear network coding is sufficient to achieve this purpose. Based on it, Ho et al. [5, 6] proposed a random linear network coding, which make the coding more easy and effective.
However, with the development of network coding comes many new challenges for the security. One of the security challenges is pollution attack, in which the adverse nodes can intentionally pollute the transmitted messages or inject the forged messages into the networks. Signature approaches based on hash functions such as SHA or MD5 used in traditional networks are no longer suitable for network coding, because the source's signatures were destroyed by the encoding process on each node.
Related Work
In recently, several schemes have been proposed to address the pollution attacks against network coding applications. These schemes could be separated into two categories: information theoretic approaches and cryptographic approaches.
Information theoretic approaches:
A main method in information theoretic approaches is introducing redundant information into original packets for enabling recovery from malicious faults, such as in [17] [18] [19] . These approaches have the advantage of not relying on any computational assumptions, but are limited to offer security only against relatively limited class of adversaries, and the communication overhead by these approaches is significant.
Cryptographic approaches:
Cryptographic approaches reply on the computational assumptions, in this kind of approaches, the source uses cryptographic techniques to generate and append authentication information to corresponding messages and allow the intermediate nodes to verify the integrity of received packets. In this paper, we mainly introduce the cryptographic approaches.
Homomorphic hashing function for network coding was first proposed by Krohn et al. [7] , in their scheme, the source computes the hash values h 1 , h 2 , … , h n for the messages m 1 , m 2 , … , m n and distributes these hash values to all the nodes in the network. When an encoded messages M from m 1 , m 2 , … , m n is received by a node, the hash value h M of M can be computed from the hash function, and from the hash values h 1 , h 2 , … , h n , then the message M is verified. A main drawback of this signature scheme is that it requires the sender to know the entire file in advance before the authentication information can be computed. This limits the applicability of the scheme for transmission of streaming data. In Zhen Yu et al. [8] , the forwarders compose the signatures for their output messages from those of input messages using the similar way that the output messages are composed from the input messages. Since each node appends the signatures to its output messages, its downstream nodes can verify the messages. Charles et al. [9] proposed a new homomorphic hashing scheme which is built on top of expensive Weil pairing operations [10, 11] over elliptic curves. All the schemes described above require expensive computation in verification, which greatly slow down the efficiency of verification. Jing Dong et al. [12] proposed a scheme which uses time-based checksum to allow the intermediate nodes to authenticate the received messages. However, this scheme requires time synchronization between senders and receivers, which is unpractical. The signature scheme proposed by Yixin Jiang et al. [15] requires expensive computation also in verification.
Our Contribution
For the signature schemes of network coding, verification speed is a very important metric for evaluating performance of schemes. In this paper, we proposed a new homomorphic signature scheme based on a linear computational homomorphic hash function, which will greatly improve the efficiency of verification at the receivers, the verification speed in our scheme is much greater than other existing signature schemes for network coding, such as [8] , [9] and [15] (more details in section 5). The receivers in our scheme will verify the integrity of received encoded messages and stop the propagating of pollution by discarding those polluted messages, the replaying attack is also infeasible in our scheme. The homomorphic signature function in our scheme is based on Bresson's homomorphic encryption. Algorithm which is first proposed by Emmanuel Bresson et al. [13] for encryption.
In the next section we will introduce the model of network coding briefly, our signature scheme is proposed in section 3, and the proof of security is explained in section 4. Section 5 is the performance analysis of our scheme. This paper is concluded in section 6, and the last section is acknowledgment.
BACKGROUND 2.1. Linear Network Coding
In this paper, we model the network with a directed graph G d = (E, V e ), where E is the set of links and V e is the set of vertices in the network. There is a source node S∈V e wishes to send a set of original messages MES={m 1 , m 2 , … , m n } to the set of destination nodes, T∈V e , each original message is augmented as:
, where m i and (0,…,0,1,0,…,0) , thus the message M i is separated into two parts, the first part is data part (m i ), and the second part is coding vector ( . The data part is an element in Z q and the coding vector part is a vector in . Each node in network processes the received messages as follows. Upon receiving messages y 1 ,y 2 ,…,y l on its l income edges, a node computes and transmits message on its outgoing edges, where each c i acts as the coding coefficient.
When any destination node receives n linearly-independent vectors w 1 , w 2 , …, w n , it can recover the original messages as follows:
where denotes the coding vector of w i , thus for any received message , . Such as shown in Fig. 1 , assume that we multicast two data bits b 1 and b 2 from the source S to both the nodes Y and Z. In the Fig. 1(a) , every channel carries either the bit b 1 or the bit b 2 as indicated, and every forwarder simply replicates and sends out the bit(s) received from upstream. Therefore, the channel from W to X is used twice. Fig. 1(b) depicts a different way which used in network coding to multicast the two bits b 1 and b 2 on the same network as in Fig. 1(a) . This time, the node W derives the bit b 1 +b 2 from the received bits b 1 and b 2 , that is to encode the bits b 1 and b 2 , the channel from W to X transmits b 1 +b 2 , which is then replicated at X for passing on to Y and Z. Then, the node Y 
Threat Model 2.2.1 Pollution Attacks
A main security challenge is pollution attack in network coding, in which the adverse nodes can intentionally pollute the transmitted messages or create the forged messages and inject these messages into the encoded messages. These attacks prevent the destination nodes from recovering the source messages from the encoded messages correctly, and what's more, the polluted messages can quickly propagate into the networks and infect a large proportion of nodes, because the downstream nodes will multicast these polluted messages. As depicted in Fig. 1(c) , the dotted lines denote the paths which the polluted messages propagate along, b 2 ' is a corrupted message from node U, when the corrupted message b 2 ' combine with b 1 , the new combination b 1 +b 2 ' is also corrupted, then the pollution pass down to the path WX, XY and XZ. When Y receives message b 1 and b 1 +b 2 ', it can't decode b 1 and b 2 correctly. Therefore, it is necessary for each node in the network to verify the integrity of every received message. 
Replaying Attacks
Sometimes, the source node needs to transmit a file by multiple generations, therefore, an adversary may injects an "old" packet got from a previous generation into current generation, if the original messages in current generation are signed by the same private key which was used in a previous generation, then this old packet can pass through any validation in current generation. Some signature schemes such as in [5, 15] cannot defend against this kind of attacks.
Bresson's Homomorphic Encryption Algorithm
In this paper, our homomorphic hash function is constructed based on Bresson's homomorphic encryption algorithm, his algorithm works as follows: Let Q be a composite modulus product of two large primes, let CG be the cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo Q 2 .
Key Generation: Choose a random element , a random value a ∈ [1, ord(CG)] and set g =α 2 mod Q 2 and h=g a mod Q 2 . The public key is (Q, g, h) while the corresponding secret key is a.
Encrypt: Given a message m ∈ Z Q , a random pad r is chosen uniformly and at random in the cipher text (A, B) is computed as:
Decrypt: Knowing a, one can compute m as: , for any two messages m 1 , m 2 ∈Z Q , their cipher texts are E(m 1 ) =(A 1 , B 1 ) and E(m 2 ) = (A 2 , B 2 ), where:
So Bresson's homomorphic encryption Algorithm is an additive homomorphic function ( [13, 14] ). 
3. PROPOSED SIGNATURE SCHEME In our signature scheme, the source node signs every message and appends the signatures to the corresponding message. The forwarder nodes use the public key and the appended signatures to verify the integrity of the received messages, they could also use these signatures and the homomorphic function to compute new combined signatures for the corresponding encoded messages without knowing the source secrete key.
Homomorphic Hash and Signature Function
Bresson's algorithm [13] is originally used to encrypt message. Due to its additive homomorphic property, we recognized it can be used to construct homomorphic signature for network coding finely. Consider that it's not necessary to encrypt or decrypt the messages in the signature scheme, and for the computation efficiency, we omit some operations which were designed for decryption, such as A=g r mod Q 2 , h r and the decryption. 
where r i is randomly selected from Z p . The signature on M is defined as: 
We also have , for i=1,2, we have: 
Our Signature Scheme
In our signature scheme, such as shown in Fig. 2 , the source first augments the original message by appending coding vector, and then uses its private keys to compute and append signature to the corresponding message. As shown in the middle picture of Fig. 2 , each intermediate node first verifies the integrity of these received messages without decoding them, and then combines these verified messages and outputs the combination into the network at last, as our signature is based on the homomorphic hash function, which guarantees that any receiver can composes the encoded message's signature from those received signatures of the corresponding messages without knowing the source's private keys. When a destination node receives n linear-independent verified messages, it can recover original messages from these received messages. Our scheme is defined as follows: G is a (multiplicative) cyclic group with prime order p, id is the identifier of generation; f 1 (·) is a one way hash function such as SHA-1 or MD5, f 2 (·) is a hash function such that f 2 : (0,1) * →G; f = f 2 f 1 , thus f(x)=f 2 (f 1 (x)) is a (0,1) * →G one way hash function; 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will respectively analyze the pollution attacks and replaying attacks, we assume that the source is always trusted and the forwarders may not be trusted.
Pollution Attacks
It's easy to see that the security of our signature scheme is based on the RSA algorithm, we can prove that breaking our signature scheme is equivalent to breaking the RSA algorithm. 
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Proof -For any w, w'
, w≠w', without loss of generality, we suppose w> w'. If h 1 (w)=h 1 (w'), thus (1+wq) mod q 2 =(1+w'q) mod q 2 , then we have (1+wq)− (1+w'q) mod q 2 =0, thus (w−w')q mod q 2 =0, then we have w−w'=kq for some integer k, but w, w'<q, then we have k=0, thus w=w', this contradicts the assumption w>w' in Z q , then we can conclude that h(w) is a collision-free function. Proof -We first consider the case that n=2, thus CV = (c 1 , c 2 ) and its hash value , the adversary attempts to generate a hash collision Theorem 3 shows that an adversary cannot generate a forged message for a given signature.
The next we will prove that generating a valid signature for a given message without private key is also infeasible.
Theorem 4:
Assuming that DLP is hard, in this proposed signature scheme, generating a signature for a given message without private key is equivalent to breaking RSA signature scheme.
The proof is obviously, the security of our signature scheme is based on the security of RSA. If a forger F attempts to generate valid signature σ for a given coding vector CV=(c 1 ,…,c n ), this means this forger must find an algorithm A such that , which breaks the RSA.
Replaying Attacks
Adversary may inject an old packet from a previous generation into current generation, so it is necessary for our scheme to filter out these replayed packets. Let (W', σ'(W'),id') denotes an old packet from a previous generation id', id is the identifier of current generation. From id'≠id, we can get h 2 (CV',id')≠h 2 (CV',id), then . As , then we can get , which means this old packet from generation id' cannot pass the verification in generation id.
To sum up, we can conclude that our signature scheme is secure enough to defend against pollution attacks and replaying attacks.
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VERIFICATION EFFICIENCY
In network coding, verification at the forwarders should be done as fast as possible, it's the bottleneck of the whole network and prevents the source from sending messages at the optimal rate. Hence, verification speed is the most important metric for evaluating performance of schemes.
Let ω be a prime number and χ a power of different prime with ω<<χ, E is an elliptic curve over Z χ . In scheme [8] , [9] and [15] , every original message is a vector with dimension k, the source then appends a n-dimension coding vector on it, such as X= (x 1 , x 2 , …, x k , c 1 ,…, c n ) , where
Charles et al. [9] have shown the verification of a signature in their scheme requires O(klog 2+ε χ) bit operations, where ε>0.
The signature scheme in [15] have similar verification time with [9] , although their scheme proposed a verification scheme which can reduce the verification time, we only discuss the time complexity of the algorithm.
In [8] , the verification of a signature requires about k+n+1 modular exponentiations, every modular exponentiation requires O(log(1+ε)(log 2 ϕ)) bit operations, where log(1+ε) is the length of coefficient, then the verification requires O[(1+n+k)log(1+ε)(log 2 ϕ)] bit operations. This paper compared the verification time with [9] , for one message, the verification time are respective 1.44 second and 16.54 second in [8] and [9] , and the time in [15] is similar to [9] .
In our scheme, the source message is given as M i =(m i , c 1 ,…, c n ) (i=1,..,n), thus the original message m i is 1-dimension, but they have the same size with those original messages in [8] and [9] (namely length(m i )=length(x 1 , x 2 , …, x k )). We do not separate the original message into k dimensions, the verification of a signature requires about n+2 modular exponentiations: so the time complexity is O[(1+n)log(1+ε)(log 2 ϕ)]. Table 1 shows the time complexity of verification. Since ω<<χ and in practical network, k>>n and the length of the coefficient log(1+ε) should be large enough, then as depicted in Table 1 , it's easy to conclude that the verification in our scheme is more effective than other schemes: [9, 15] We also compared CJL's scheme [9] , Zhen's scheme [8] and our scheme in experiment, the implementation of these scheme is built on MATLAB and tested on Athlon64 X2 3600+ 2.00GHz Windows XP machine. The length of the message in this implementation is from 1×10 5 ×2 30 to 10×10 5 ×2 30 bits. The result in Fig. 3 clearly shows that our scheme performs much greater than those in [8, 9, 15] . 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a novel fast signature scheme for network coding to defend against pollution attacks. In this scheme, the polluted messages will be discarded by the intermediate nodes. As network coding requires each receiver in network to verify the integrity of received messages for security, verification speed is the most important metric for evaluating performance of schemes. Our signature scheme proposed in this paper is more efficient for receivers to verify the received message in network coding, and it has been proven that the verification computational efficiency of this scheme is much greater than those in [8] , [9] and [15] , with the length of signature two times longer than the length of combined message. Therefore, our scheme is practical for those network coding scenarios which owned sufficient bandwidth but low computing capability.
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